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MINERAL RIGHTS*
Harriet S. Daggett**
A suit was filed in Broussard v. Hassie Hunt Trust' by the
initial lessor, landowner, to cancel a lease for failure to reason-
ably develop it. The lease had been twice transferred since its
origin. A clause in the first transfer purported to absolve the
lessee from all responsibility and place the transferee in position
to fulfill all obligations of the lease to the original lessor. The
word assignment appeared in the instrument. However, the
transfers had provided for overriding royalty and thus were sub-
leases and not assignments. Hence, the court under a well-settled
rule held there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff
(lessor) and the defendant (sublessee), no right of action, and
the suit was dismissed. There is no departure from established
jurisprudence in this case. The test of real control as evidenced
by retention of royalty or otherwise, rather than words or lack
thereof in the instrument, was maintained. The principles of the
relationship between landlord and under-tenant were cited.2
In Sun Oil Co. v. State Mineral Board,s the Louisiana Legis-
lature by Act 513 of 1952 provided that the State Mineral Board
might execute mineral leases upon land owned in indivision by
five hundred or more persons if petitioned to do so by fifty or
more of the co-owners. Such a lease was granted by the Mineral
Board. A co-owner and his lessee attacked the lease by the Min-
eral Board as being invalid because of the unconstitutionality
*Permission has been granted by Matthew Bender and Company to use certain
cases reported herein as have been reported by the writer in the Oil and Gas Re-
porter, sponsored by the Southwest Legal Foundation of Dallas, Texas, and pub-
lished by that company.
**Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 231 La. 474, 91 So.2d 762 (1956).
2. For further discussion and references, see Warren, Transfer of the Oil and
Gas Lessee's Interest, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 386 (1956) ; Moses, Subleases - The
Legal Relation Between the Lessor, Sublessor and Sublessee, 2 LA. B.J. 177
(1955) ; Moses, Assignments and Subleases of Oil and Gas and Mineral Leases in
Louisiana, 23 Tux. L. REv. 231 (1948) : Moses, Distinction Between a Sublease
and an Assignment of a Mineral Lease in Louisiana, 18 TExAs L. REV. 159
(1940) ; Note, 82 A.L.R. 1273 (1933), concerning the development of land and
the payment of royalties under oil and gas leases as affected by assignment of
lease or sublease as to a portion of the land; and the casenotes on the distinction
between a sublease and an assignment at 23 MISS. L.J. 299 (1952) and 6 TUL. L.
Rxv. 312 (1932) ; BROWN, ASSIGNMENTS OF INTERESTS IN OIL AND GAS LEASES,
FIFT AiNuAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 25 (1954);
Sullivan, Assignments by the Landowner and the Lessee, 17 MONT. L. REv. 64
(1955); TucxER, SUBLEASE AND ASSIGNMENT; SOME OF THE PROBLEMS RESULT-
.ING FROM THE DISTINCTION, Tnm ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 176
(1955).
3. 231 La. 689, 92 So.2d 583 (1956).
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of the statute. The court found the lease by the co-owner invalid
for the lack of consent of all other co-owners and held the statute
constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power to conserve
minerals, since it would be a practical impossibility to obtain a
valid lease otherwise, due to the number of co-owners. It would
appear that the decision was eminently correct. The square
grounding on the power to conserve is heartening and in accord
with the well-settled policies and practices of the state.4
Gulf Refining Company v. The Hunter Company5 presents
the question of interpretation of an instrument conveying land,
and as further consideration for this land, a mineral interest.
Prescription of this interest had been successfully pleaded below
and was maintained in this decision. The portion of the instru-
ment in question is presented as follows:
"And as a further consideration hereof, La Prairie Ma-
ronne Companie agrees and binds itself to deliver to the
vendor herein, his heirs or assigns, one-eighth (1/8) of all
oil or other mineral substances produced from said tract of
land herein conveyed, free of all charges and expenses, at
the wells or mines where produced."
No drilling or production from the land had occurred within ten
years from the date of the sale of land. Thereafter, production
was secured. If royalty or servitude had been reserved by the
vendor of the land, prescription under these facts would have
accrued in either case. The theory presented by plaintiffs, how-
ever, was that it was neither royalty nor servitude, and was but
a deferred payment of consideration. Their major support was
the case of Rudnick v. Union Producing Co.,6 involving inter-
pretation of a lease contract, the critical section of which fol-
lows:
"[A] s additional consideration, lessee agrees that if any
well drilled on the above described property makes or pro-
duces not less than fifty (50) and not over one hundred
(100) barrels of oil per day, to pay to lessor four thousand
dollars ($4,000.00) ; if any well drilled on said property
makes or produces over one hundred (100) barrels and not
over two hundred fifty (250) barrels of oil per day, to pay
4. See 2 OiL & GAs REPORTER 1399 (1953) for a discussion of Smith v. Holt
(forced pooling), cited by the court in the instant case regarding conflict of pri-
vate contractual rights and orders of the Commissioner of Conservation.
5. 231 La. 1002, 93 So.2d 537 (1957).
6. 209 La. 943, 25 So.2d 906 (1946).
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to lessor ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00); if any well
drilled on said property makes or produces over two hundred
fifty (250) barrels of oil per day, to pay lessors twenty
thousand dollars ($20,000.00) ; to be more explicit whichever
of the above sized well(s) should come in first, that special
size well shall set the money consideration to be paid."
The Supreme Court took the view that the further considera-
tion was to be paid within ten years from the happening of the
contingency upon which it depended, so long as the lease was
alive. The court in the instant case distinguished the Rudnick
case as presenting a personal obligation due within ten years
after the future condition had come to pass. Herein, the "addi-
tional consideration" was but a retention of royalty dependent
upon the happening of the uncertain event - production -
which must take place within ten years from the date of the
instrument - a real obligation running with the land. This de-
cision again marks the important distinction between the lease
contract and the burdening of the land with servitude or royalty.7
In Mallett v. Union Oil & Gas Corporation of Louisiana8 suit
was brought to cancel a lease held beyond the primary term
without production. The lessee's request for an extension had
been refused. Three days before termination the lessee had
unitized with other property, upon which there was a producing
well, and it was alleged that this held the lease under the pro-
duction clause. The court analyzed the long and involved pro-
visions of the lease and found that the clause providing for
unitization contemplated development only and did not authorize
the unitization with adjoining property which was producing.
One Justice dissented. Obviously, the case turns upon interpre-
tation of the lease, the language of which was far from clear.
Emphasis was placed upon the real purpose of the instrument,
development. The court may have been swayed, as well they
might, by the fact that after extension had been refused and
with but three days left, the lessee then resorted to unitization.
The growing importance of unitization clauses and the uncer-
tainties of their interpretation should result in more clearly
drawn instruments. The length of many leases presently in use
with paragraph sentences and the unnecessary and meaningless
7. For further references and discussions see 7 OIL & GAS REPORTER 16
(1957), 6 OIL & GAB REPORTER 448 (1956), and 3 OIL & GAS REPORTER 8
(1954).
8. 232 La. 15T, 94 So.2d 16 (1957).
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verbiage of doubtful legal scope seem to be producing uncer-
tainty and litigation rather than protection.9
In Delatte v. Woods'0 the provisions of the lease with drill or
pay clause, voluntary unitization clause, etc., are clearly set forth
in the opinion and need not be repeated in a presumably brief
synopsis of the facts of the case. The critical question in the
litigation was whether or not an order of the Commissioner of
Conservation ordering the unitizing of a portion of the leased
land with adjacent lands produced the effects claimed by the
lessee. The order declared a unit producing well as a well pro-
ducing from the unitized area, and thus producing from all of
the lands within the unit. Did this action relieve the lessee of his
promise to drill the land actually comprehended within the lease?
The court held that it did, because production within the unit is
production from anywhere within the unit and a promise to drill
is indivisible.
It had been thought by some students that after the deci-
sions declaring that the land over which a servitude reached
might be divided not only by contract but by an order of the
Commissioner of Conservation, that the same principle might
be applied in the case of a lease. This decision, following the
much-discussed cases of Hunter v. Shell Oil Co."' and LeBlanc
v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co.,'2 dispels these thoughts and,
perhaps, hopes of analysts of mineral law problems. Justice
Hamiter continues to maintain his stand, taken so firmly as a
dissenter in Hunter v. Shell Oil Co., and with the same cogent
reasons. Thus, the lessor is again remitted for possible relief to
other breached clauses of the lease, notably, failure to have
diligently developed, a tortuous and expensive procedure at best.
A lessor sued for cancellation of his lease in Bollinger v.
Texas Co.'" for failure to pay royalties from production. "Shut-
in" payments had been made which were provided for in the
lease but not in case production was flowing. Sales of this pro-
duction had been made. Failure to pay production royalties,
9. For a discussion of pooling provisions in general, see Hoffman, Pooling and
Unitization Olause in Oil Leases, 1ST ROCKY MT. MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 103
(1955); HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION 87-137 (1954);
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW 150-155. See Comment, The Right
of the Lessee to Pool the Mineral Interest Before and After the Expiration of the
Primary Term, 10 Sw. L. J. 165 (1956).
10. 232 La. 341, 94 So.2d 281 (1957).
11. 211 La. 893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947).
12. 218 La. 463, 49 So.2d 855 (1950).
13. 232 La. 637, 95 So.2d 132 (1957).
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likened unto rent, have long constituted a breach and grounds
for cancellation. It was again so held. Two Justices dissented
upon the major ground that the lessor had received more from
the shut-in payments than he would have been entitled to re-
ceive from production. It would seem that the decision is in line
with well-established principles regarding leases, adapted to
mineral leases. Much emphasis has been placed upon the con-
tract phase of lease and, hence, a lessor would have a right to
cancel for breach, whether he lost or gained economically, a
matter for his own decision. It appeared that the lessee was
most anxious to secure from the lessor a revised and enlarged
provision for voluntary unitization. Whether or not this influ-
enced the decision is, of course, purely speculative.
In Elkins v. Roseberry14 a landowner brought suit to have a
mineral servitude declared extinguished by prescription of ten
years. The defense was that the landowner and servitude owner
had executed a joint lease, which would have under previous
jurisprudence extended the life of the servitude for the primary
term of the lease. Thus, the real issue was whether or not the
lease was joint, as stated by the court. The facts were examined
and it was found that there was no intention by the landowner
to extend the life of the servitude, which, therefore, had expired.
Obviously, the question was to be resolved on the evidence ad-
duced. The lease "was not signed by the parties at the same
time." There was no specific statement of an intention to
lengthen the life of the servitude. The landowner did not accept
joint rentals after the original term of the servitude had ex-
pired. The landowner leased again after extinguishment of the
original term. Moreover, and most importantly, the court has
long emphasized the need for clear and express intendment to
interrupt or extend a servitude. Thus, the decision is in line with
their wise and just attitude in regard to these questions.
The following cases appeared during the year but contained
little that was really pertinent to this section: Richardson &
Bass v. Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee Dis-
trict,15 Seiber v. Ringgold,'6 Sun Oil Co. v. Kinder Canal Co.,1 T7
and Simmons v. Cowper.i8
14. 96 So.2d 41 (La. 1957).
15. 231 La. 299, 91 So.2d 353 (1966).
16. 231 La. 983, 93 So.2d 530 (1957).
17. 231 La. 1039, 93 So.2d 551 (1957).
18. 96 So.2d 646 (La. 1957).
